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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing the claim of the widow. Then the subsequent addition of the wid-
ow's claim will have one of two inequitable results: (1) If all the lia-
bilities computed in the pro-rata are paid at once, the estate will be
exhausted, having nothing for the subsequent claim of the widow, or
(2) if only the mortgagee be paid and the widow's claim then thrown
in with the other unpaid creditors, it will reduce their pro-rata share,
thereby making the mortgagee's claim preferred to those of other cred-
itors of equal rank. Under the first procedure it is impossible to avoid
this problem, because if the mortgagee draws on the personalty, dower
cannot remain untouched, for the insolvent estate pays only a ratable
share, thus leaving a residue of debt which will ultimately bring in the
widow as creditor. However, if the seconf method be used, all the
claims are definite and simultaneously computable, thus facilitating the
administration of estates and correcting the inequities arising from two
computations.
Accordingly, it is recommended that North Carolina follow its
precedents in allowing priority only in a surplus existing after satisfac-
tion of the mortgage debt, and that the intimation of the principal case
receive no embodiment in our law.
J. KENYON WILSON, JR.
Injunctions-Courts-Injunction Against Threatened
Violation of Agreement Not to Sue.
Plaintiffs petitioned Polk County Superior Court to enjoin the hus-
band of one of them from instituting against the other plaintiff a
civil action in Forsyth County Superior Court for alienation of plaintiff
wife's affections. It was alleged that defendant husband had signed
separation papers accompanied by an agreement to refrain from bring-
ing such a suit, that the threatened suit would violate said agreement,
and would do irreparable injury to plaintiff wife's character. The trial
judge granted a temporary injunction until the final hearing, and de-
fendant appealed. Held, affirmed.'
The problem of enjoining litigation brought or threatened in viola-
tion of an agreement not to sue may involve litigation in the courts of
another state, 2 in a local inferior court,3 or in a court of concurrent
jurisdiction with that in which the injunction is sought or in another
branch of the same court. This note deals with the latter situation.
Some states by statute4 or by judicial decision,r purport to deprive
' Boone v. Boone, 217 N. C. 722, 9 S. E. (2d) 383 (1940).
2 Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 235.
' Bomneisler v. Forster, 154 N. Y. 229, 48 N. E. 534 (1897).
4Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66; 17 HALSOURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1911) 261.
State v. Rightor, 39 La. Ann. 619, 2 So. 385 (1887) ; Schumert-Waifield-Buja,
Inc. v. Buie, 148 La. 726, 87 So. 726 (1921); Kuhn v. Beard, 151 La. 546, 92
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the courts of power to entertain an independent action for injunction.
Particularly is this so when the litigation is pending in a court which
has taken jurisdiction 6 and which can afford adequate relief by equitable
defense. 7 Other states, however, concede that power exists8 to enjoin
the litigation in an independent action but hold that it is error 9 to
exercise it save in the exceptional case where an equitable defense or
counterclaim in the same action will not sufficiently help. 10 Both lines
of cases are motivated by a desire to conserve the economy of judicial
administration" in a concurrent or single judicial system. The distinc-
tion between a void injunction and an erroneous one is vital in con-
tempt proceedings.
12
So. 52 (1922) ; Grant v. Quick, 5 Sandf. 612 (N. Y. 1852) ; Bennet v. Le Roy,
14 How. Pr. 178 (N. Y 1857) ; Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154 (N. Y. 1857) ;
Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 66 P. (2d) 365 (1937). But see note 10, injra.
6 State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W.
155 (1935); Mo. R.v. STAT. (1919) §1951, Wabash Ry. v. Sweet, 103 Mo. App.
267, 77 S. W. 123 (1903); Childs v. Martin, 69 N. C. 126 (1873); Young v.
Rollins, 85 N. C. 485 (1881).
"Anthony v. Dunlap, 8 Cal. 27. (1857) ; Wilson v. Baker, 64 Cal. 475, 2 Pac.
253 (1884); S. C. CODE (1932) §6004, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yance,
181 S. C. 369, 187 S. E. 536 (1936).8Engels v. Lubeck, 4 Cal. 31 (1854); Meredith v. Crowder, 81 Ind. App.
221, 142 N. E. 876 (1924); Williams v. Payne, 150 Kan. 462, 94 P. (2d) 341
(1939); Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561, 65 S. W. 731 (1901); Capitain v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 Mo. 484, 144 S. W. 466 (1912); State ex
rel. Terry v. Allen, 308 Mo. 230, 271 S. W. 469 (1925) ; Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45
N. Y. 637 (1871) ; Van Sinderen v. Lawerence, 50 Hon. 272, 3: N. Y. Supp. 25
(1888); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stalla, 166 App. Div. 639, 152 N. Y. Supp.
183 (1st Dep't 1915).
0 Bickett v. Johnson, 8 Cal. 34 (1857); Wilson v. Baker, 64 Cal. 475, 2 Pac.
253 (1884) ; Galey v. Board of Com'rs., 174 Ind. 181, 91 N. E. 593 (1910) ; State
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., 195 Minn. 169, 262 N. W. 155 (1935) ;
Wabash Ry. v. Sweet, 103 Mo. App. 267, 77 S. W. 123 (1903) ; Burke v. Burke,
212 N. Y. 303, 160 N. E. 62 (1914) ; Rosenberg v. Mount Carmel Cemetery Ass'n.,
244 N. Y. 573, 155 N. E. 902 (1927); McReynolds v. Harshaw, 37 N. C. 195
(1842) ; Childs v. Martin, 69 N. C. 126 (1873) ; Young v. Rollins, 85 N. C. 485
(1881); Davis v. Federal Land Batik, 217 N. C. 145, 7 S. E. (2d) 373 (1940);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yance, 181 S. C. 369, 187 S. E. 536 (1936).
10 Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637 (1871). Cf note 5, supra.
1 Conversely, for this same reason, the court first taking jurisdiction some-
times finds it necessary to enjoin other litigation respecting the same subject
matter. Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561, 65 S. W. 731 (1901); Capitain v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 Mo. 484, 144 S. W. 466 (1912) ; State ex rel.
Terry v. Allen, 308 Mo. 230, 271 S. W. 469 (1925); Van Sinderen v. Lawerence,
50 Hun. 272, 3 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1888); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stalla, 166
App. Div. 639, 152 N. Y. Supp. 183 (1st Dep't 1915) ; See Wabash Ry. v. Sweet,
103 Mo. App. 276, 280, 77 S. W. 123, 124 (1903); Erie Ry. v. Ramsey, 45 N.
Y. 637, 647 (1871).
'2 Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 121 S. W. 742 (1909); People v. Barrett,
203 Ill. 99, 67 N. E. 742 (1903); State v. Meyer, 86 Kan. 793, 122 Pac. 101
(1912); Saginaw Lumber & Salt Co. v. Griffore, 145 Mich. 287, 108 N. W.
681 (1906) ; McHenry v. State, 91 Miss. 562, 44 So. 831 (1907) ; St. Louis, K.
& S. Ry. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357 (1896); it re Knaup, 144 Mo.
653, 46 S. W. 151 (1898); Cauffman v. Van Buren, 136 N. Y. 253, 32 N. E.
775 (1892); Savage v. Sternberg, 19 Wash. 679, 54 Pac. 611 (1898); Cline v.
Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 129 N. W. 400 (1911).
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Where, however, the litigation prohibited by the agreement not to
sue has not been instituted but is merely threatened, other considera-
tions, of a quia tinet nature, become important. Even if an equitable
defense might suffice had the suit been brought, it may be that an inde-
pendent injunction is justified where the very threat of litigation works
irreparable harm. For example, such a threat might operate as a
cloud on title and frighten away the prospective purchasers of land.1 8
If, on the other hand, it is the actual institution of the suit itself which
is feared, specific performance of the agreement not to sue, effectuated
through an equitable defense1 4 to the main suit once it has been brought,
would appear to be the appropriate remedy' 5 in most cases.
The situation in the principal case does not appear to have war-
ranted independent injunction. Rather, it might better have been left
to be dealt with by an equitable defense, based upon the agreement not
to sue, to the action for alienation of affections when brought. Such a
disposition of the matter would have been more in harmony with the
relations necessary between two coordinate branches of the North Caro-
lina Superior Court and with the policy of effectuating, as far as pos-
sible, complete relief in the same action. Any notion that the plaintiff
wife needed an independent injunction to protect her reputation against
the allegations and proofs in the threatened action for alienation of
affections is strangely at variance with her own disclosures of miscon-
duct in the injunction suit.
The court relied upon a North Carolina case'0 of injunction against
litigation in the courts of another state and a New York case' 7 of
injunction against litigation pending in a local inferior court. Neither
situation parallels that of the principal case. In the first, the North
Carolina case, the foreign court was not in a reciprocal position. In
the second, the Bomeisler case, the litigation enjoined was pending in
the superior court of the city of New York and not in another branch
of the state-wide supreme court. The opinion does not deal with the
fact that as between such branches independent injunctions against
litigation, once regarded as nullities,' 8 are now held, unless indispen-
21 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1743, Power Co. v. Power Co., 175
N. C. 668, 96 S. E. 99 (1918).I'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §519, Russell v. Adderton, 64 N. C.
417 (1870); Harshaw v. Woofin, 64 N. C. 568 (1870); Evans v. Roper, 74
N. C. 639 (1876); Craven v. Freeman, 82 N. C. 361 (1880); MCINToSH, N. C.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §461(6).1 MCINTosH, N. C. PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §862, n. 87; Burke v.
Burke, 212 N. Y. 303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).
" Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58 (1907). See note 2, supra.
17 Bomeisler v. Forster, 154 N. Y. 229, 48 N. E. 534 (1897).
" Grant v. Quick, 5 Sandf. 612 (N. Y. 1852) ; Bennet v. Le Roy, 14 How. Pr.
178 (N. Y. 1857); Winfield v. Bacon, 24 Barb. 154 (N. Y. 1857).
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sable, to be erroneous and reversible upon appeal. 19 Moreover, two
suits had begun following two successive settlements, and the court
felt that a mere defense to the pending action would not effectively
prevent the repetition of this persistent persecution. Finally, the New
York court has since reversed an injunction against an action pend-
ing, in violation of a settlement, in another branch of the supreme court;
compelled resort to a defense in that action, even though the complaint
therein attacked the character of the plaintiff -in the injunction suit;
and restricted the Bomeisler case to its special facts.20
It is submitted that the principal case unnecessarily complicates the
North Carolina procedure. PHILIP E. LuCAS.
Receiverships-Priority of Operating Expenses Over
Secured Creditors in the Corpus.
At the instance of parties other than the secured creditors a lumber
corporation was put in the hands of a receiver with authority to con*-
tinue the business. The court ordered the receiver to sell certain
lumber, which was the sole asset of the company, and which had been
pledged to appellants (secured creditors). The court further ordered
the receiver to retain twenty percent of the money realized from the sale
to pay the expenses of the receivership and to remit the balance to the
secured creditors. Held, order affirmed. Where a receivership enures
to the benefit of a lienholder, his lien is subordinate to the adminis-
trative expenses.'
In Fosdick v. Schal,2 the United States Supreme Court adopted the
rule that in railroad receiverships the operating expenses have a priority
in payment out of the current income over the mortgagees of the corpus,
and a payment to the mortgagees out of the current income is a diver-
sion which gives the operating expenses a priority on the corpus equal
in amount to the diversion. The court declared that railroads were
affected with such vital public interest that they were obligated to con-
tinue operation. This rule has been unanimously followed as to rail-
roads,3 and later cases have added that if the current income be in-
"o Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y, 637 (1871) ; Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y.
303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).20 Burke v. Burke, 212 N. Y. 303, 106 N. E. 62 (1914).
'Wood v. Woodbury & Pace, Inc., 217 N. C. 356, 8 S. E. (2d) 240 (1940).
299 U. S. 235, 25 L. ed. 339 (1878).
'Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776, 4 Sup. Ct. 675, 28 L. ed. 596 (1884);
Calhoun v. St. Louis & S. E. Ry., 14 Fed. 9 (C. C. D. Ind. 1880); Clark v.
Central R. R. & Banking Co., 66 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895); Central Bk.
& Tr. Co. v. Greenville & Western R. R., 248 Fed. 350 (W. D. S. C. 1918);
Central Tr. Co. of N. Y. v. Pittsburg S. & N. R. R., 223 N. Y. 347, 119
N. E. 565 (1918) ; MclIlhemey v. Bing, 80 Tex. 4, 13 S. W. 655 (1890); Belling-
ham Bay Improv. Co. v. Fairhaven & N. W. Ry., 17 Wash. 371, 49 Pac. 514(1897).
1940]
